Game theoretic analysis of environmental impact assessment system in China

查看全文 作　　者：CHENG [1]Hongguang;QI [2]Ye;PU [1]Xiao;GONG [1]Li

机构地区：[1]School of Environment,Beijing Normal University,Beijing 100875,China;[2]School of Public Policy and Management,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China

出　　处：《Frontiers of Environmental Science & Engineering》索引2007年第1卷第4期,共6页

摘　　要：Environmental impact assessment(EIA)system has been established in China since 1973.In present EIA cases,there are four participants in general:governments,enterprises,EIA organizations and the public.The public has held responsible for both social costs and social duties.The public supervises social costs produced by enterprises discharging pollutant in EIA.However public participation is mostly deputized by governments,which severely weaken the independence of the public as one participant in EIA.In this paper,EIA refers to the different attitudes of the par-ticipants whose optional strategies may be described by a proper game model.According to disfigurements in EIA,three sides(governments,enterprises,and EIA organizations)dynamic iterative game theory of many phases is established referring to iterative game theory,dynamic game theory of incomplete information,and perfect Bayesian equilibrium theory to analyze the reciprocity relation among governments,EIA organizations and enterprises.The results show that in a short period,economic benefit is preponderant over social benefit.Governments and enterprises both do not want to take EIA to reveal social costs.EIA organizations’income comes from enterprises and the collusions are built between them to vindicate economic benefit.In a long run,social benefit loss caused by environmental pollution must be recuperated sooner or later and environmental deterioration will influence the achievements of economic benefit,so both governments and enterprises are certain to pursue high social benefit and willing to take EIA,helpful to increase private benefit.EIA organizations will make fair assessment when their economic benefit are ensured.At present,the public as silent victims can not take actual part in EIA.The EIA system must be improved to break the present equilibrium of three sides,bringing the public to the equilibrium to exert public supervision. 关键词：environmental impact assessment(EIA) three sides dynamic iterative game theory of many phases perfect Bayesian equilibrium

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Game theoretic analysis of environmental impact assessment system in China

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