Strategic Interaction in Spending on Environmental Protection:Spatial Evidence from Chinese Cities

查看全文 作　　者：Huihui [1]Deng;Xinye [2]Zheng;Nan [2]Huang;Fanghua [3]Li

机构地区：[1]Institute of International Economy,University of International Business and Economics;[2]School of Economics,Renmin University of China;[3]Department of Economics,University of California

出　　处：《China & World Economy》索引2012年第20卷第5期,共18页

基　　金：supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities;the Research Funds of Renmin University of China (11XNL009) 摘　　要：In China,the responsibility of protecting the environment lies largely with local governments. Within the framework of spatial econometrics,we investigate empirically the consequence of such an institutional setting.Using city-level data for China,the present study finds that city governments behave strategically in making spending decisions regarding environmental protection.This paper finds that a city government appears to cut its own spending as a response to the rise in environmental protection spending by its neighbors.Hence, environmental protection tends to be underprovided.As a result,we suggest that centralizing the environmental protection responsibility to a higher level of government would be beneficial in terms of controlling pollution in China. 关键词：城市空间环境保护中国环保责任证据消费地方政府城市政府

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Strategic Interaction in Spending on Environmental Protection:Spatial Evidence from Chinese Cities

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